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UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
PREHISTORIC ACCOUNTING AND THE 
PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION: 
ON RECENT ARCHEOLOGICAL 
EVIDENCE OF THE MIDDLE-EAST 
FROM 8000 B.C. TO 3000 B.C. 
Abstract: Recent archeological research offers revolutionary in-
sight about the precursor of abstract counting and pictographic as 
well as ideographic writing. This precursor was a data processing 
system in which simple (and later complex) clay tokens of various 
shapes were aggregated in hollow clay receptacles or envelopes (and 
later sealed string systems) to represent symbolically assets and 
economic transactions. Scores of such tokens (the recent explana-
tion of which is due to Prof. Schmandt-Besserat) were found by 
archeologists all over the Fertile Crescent in layers belonging to 
the time between 8000 B.C. to 3100 B.C. — after this date 
cuneiform clay tablets emerged. 
The economic-philosophic implications of this discovery are 
important. First, it suggests that accounting preceded abstract 
counting as well as writing. Second, it suggests that conceptual 
representation emerged gradually. Third, it confirms the previous 
hypotheses that counting emerged in several stages. Fourth, it 
reveals the existence of an abstract input-output principle some 
10,000 years ago and a kind of double entry over 5,000 years ago. 
Finally, it offers the earliest illustration of the (occasional) validity 
of the correspondence theory. 
To assist readers I have inserted at the beginning of the fifth 
section some explanatory paragraphs on Wittgenstein's work. 
Introduction 
The quest for the origin of symbolic representation is not 
unrelated to Wittgenstein's perennial question: How is lan-
This paper was initially presented as "Wittgenstein and Archeological 
Evidence of Representation and Data Processing from 8000 B.C. to 3000 B.C." 
at the 12th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg/Wechsel, Au-
stria) in August 1987. It is reproduced with permission of the General Editor of 
the Wittgenstein Publication Series, Elisabeth Leinfellner, and the publishing 
house, Hölder-Pichler-Tempskey, Vienna. Financial support by the Social Sci-
ences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for this project, and the 
valuable correspondence with Professor Schmandt-Besserat are acknowledged. 
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guage possible? Indeed a disclosure of the historical roots of 
representation might lead to a novel and empirical answer to 
Wittgenstein's major query — at least as far as written lan-
guage is concerned. 
During the last decade Professor Schmandt-Besserat, an 
archeologist at the University of Texas in Austin [1978, 1980, 
1981, 1981a, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1986a] has shed much light on 
the origin of writing and counting.1 I shall concisely recapitu-
late the history and results of her research2 and offer interpre-
tations of it from a philosophic as well as economic point of 
view. 
Symbolic Representation and the Evolution of Writing 
The invention of writing has long been shrouded in awe 
and mystery. Over the centuries many unsuccessful attempts 
have been made to expla in the or igin of this event 
[Schmandt-Besserat 1986, pp. 31-32] until in the early 19th 
century archeological expeditions to Mesopotamia began to 
clarify this problem by hard and fast evidence. A pictographic 
limestone tablet unearthed at Kish, dating from about 3000 
B.C.3 is usually regarded as the earliest piece of writing known. 
But such isolated pictographs are very rare. In contrast to them 
are the oldest collections of clay tablets found in great quan-
tities in Uruk (the biblical Erek), dating from 3100 B.C. The 
writing they contain is predominantly ideographic (abstract) 
intermingled with only occasional pictographic signs (sketches 
of objects such as a plow, chariot, sledge, boar, etc.) — but at 
this stage the boundary between ideographic and pictographic 
signs is blurred, and interpretations vary. This ideographic 
nature of early cuneiform writing from the 4th millennium B.C. 
was already recognized by Falkenstein [1936, p. 25], the first 
person to investigate them.4 The meaning of this early or 
1For details about the individual contributions of A. Leo Oppenheim, 
Pierre Amiet, Denise Schmandt Besserat, and others to the clarification of the 
origin of writing and the record keeping use of clay envelopes and string 
aggregates, see: Schmandt-Besserat [1980, pp. 358-361] as well as Jasim and 
Oates [1986, p. 348]. For a somewhat different interpretation see Vallat [1986, 
pp. 334-337]. 
2The recapitulation is mainly based on Schmandt-Besserat [1986]. 
3Mallowan [1961, p. 67] as well as Hawkes [1963, p. 378] still state this date 
with 3500 B.C. 
4Falkenstein [1964, p. 11] also emphasizes that the invention of cuneiform 
writing is the invention of the Sumerians, and that it was created exclusively 
for the recording of economic transactions. 
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archaic writing is still an enigma, partly because of its ideo-
graphic nature, partly because most ideographs could not be 
traced back to the later cuneiform writing of the first and 
second millennium B.C. — only the ideographs for sheep, oil, 
metal, labourer, measures of grain, animal and a few others 
were traceable. 
The abstract form of these symbols as well as the large 
repertory of them (over a thousand different signs) combined 
with the scarcity of preceding pictographs posed a vexing 
question as to the evolution of writing. Surely it cannot have 
happened overnight, it must have gradually evolved. Yet where 
was the missing link, where was the prototype? It seems 
plausible that writing started with a relatively small number of 
pictographs, which gradually increased in number, slowly 
changing into ideographs. Out of lack of any evidence, it was 
hypothesized that the proto-writing must have been on perish-
able material and thus lost to posterity [Diringer 1968, p. 19]. 
However, Schmandt-Besserat advanced a much better sub-
stantiated and more plausible hypothesis. She noticed (from 
1969 onwards) on occasion of visits to many archeological sites 
and museums an unexpectedly large number of odd and 
hitherto unexplained artifacts of various shapes to which she 
refers as "tokens" and among which she distinguished two 
major types: the earlier plain tokens (spheres, disks, cylinders, 
triangles, rectangles, cones, ovoids, and tetrahedrons) from ca. 
8000 B.C. onwards, and the later complex tokens (variously 
incised or punctated and usually perforated, also of a greater 
variety of forms — added shapes: e.g. vessel forms, parabolas 
and bent coils). These small, ubiquitous objects (ca. 1 to 4 cm. 
across) were carefully hand-molded of clay and hardened by 
Exhibit 1 
1. Plain clay tokens 
burning at a relatively low temperature (of ca. 600° C). At some 
sites only small numbers of these tokens were preserved, but at 
other sites (e.g. at Jarmo, Iraq, dated 6500 B.C.) some 1500 
3
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specimens were unear thed . Whether in Israel, Syria, Iraq, Tur-
key or I ran those art ifacts were present all over the Middle 
East in layers dat ing f rom ca. 8000 to 3000 B.C. and even later . 
This ubiqui ty and wide dispersion obviously pointed at their 
religious, cul tural or economic importance; bu t what was this 
impor tan t function? All archeologists and experts working in 
this area encountered these tokens, but none had a satisfactory 
explanation for their former use; a few experts thought they 
were amulets or game figures. But Schmandt-Besserat [cf. 1986, 
p . 34-35] noticed that the shape of many tokens matched with the 
form of archaic signs on tablets. For example , a disk with a cross, 
can be found among the tokens as well as among the signs on 
clay tablets where it became a circle wi th cross enclosed. But 
this ideograph is t raceable to later writ ings and stands for 
"sheep") similarly, an ovoid with circular incision s tands for a 
" ja r of oil", a tr iangle wi th five incised lines means "meta l 
(silver?)." The cone and the sphere s tand for small and large 
measures of grain respectively; a cylinder may be interpreted 
as "one animal (sheep or goat?)" while a disk refers most likely 
to a "flock of animals probably half a score (i.e. ten)." But let 
us listen to Schmandt-Besserat herself: 
Exhibit 2 
2. Complex clay tokens 
"About 200 spher ica l clay envelopes ( including 
fragments) have been recovered in an area extending 
f rom Palestine to Iran, including Saudi Arabia. The 
seals impressed upon their surface indicate their 
formal character , and it seems clear that the tokens 
they contain stood for goods and stated liabilities. 
The envelopes would have r ema ined of esoteric 
4
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interest but for the discovery of their relationship to 
the invention of writing. Indeed, their evolution il-
lustrates no less than the transition between an ar-
chaic abacus and writing according to the following 
sequence: (1) the invention of envelopes to hold to-
kens of specific transactions; (2) the impression of 
markings on the surface of the envelopes to indicate 
the shape and number of tokens included inside; (3) 
the collapse of the envelopes into clay balls or tablets 
bearing impressed signs; and (4) the elaboration of 
the impressed signs into incised pictographs. 
The study of the envelopes therefore provides new 
insights into the origins of writing. It makes clear the 
process of its emergence from an archaic recording 
system based on tokens and throws light upon the 
fortuitous nature of its invention. It demonstrates 
that the cradle of writing was not confined to 
Mesopotamia but extended to the west as far as the 
upper Euphrates valley in Syria and to Elam at the 
east. The date of the events can be pinpointed to the 
Uruk IV period of 3200-3100 BC" [Schmandt-
Besserat, 1980, p. 385]. 
On the basis of this evidence few experts will doubt that 
the precursor of writing was the representation of commodities 
by means of clay symbols, not all of which were miniature 
models but many were abstract shapes the meaning of which was 
determined by convention. But what kind of messages did these 
symbols convey? 
Data Processing and Accounting in Prehistoric Times 
The plain clay tokens are dating from ca. 8000 B.C. on-
wards and were discovered among village finds (and later 
temple finds) unearthed in the Fertile Crescent of the Middle 
East.5 These tokens were sometimes enclosed in a "clay en-
velope" (hollow clay ball some 10 cm in diameter, the surface of 
which bore markings — which in turn are among the first 
5The first plain tokens (around 8000 B.C.) were extracted from the remains 
of "round hut compounds" on many archeological sites of the Fertile Crescent 
— typical sites: Tell Mureybet and Tell Aswad in Syria, as well as Tepe Asiab 
and Ganj Dareh Tepe in Iran. By the seventh millennium B.C. simple tokens 
were also used in an area reaching from present Turkey to Israel. 
The proportion of perforated tokens varies according to sites. At Uruk, only 
46% are perforated but at other sites, such as Habuba Kabira in Syria, up to 
80% of the tokens have a hole. 
5
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evidence of writing — indicating the content for quick recogni-
tion, and seem to represent one of the earliest systematic 
accounting systems. One or several specimen from Uruk, for 
example, yielded the following tokens which Schmandt-
Besserat could match to the corresponding commodities as 
shown below (adapted from Schmandt-Besserat 1983, p. 120): 
Exhibit 3 
3. Clay envelope (showing seal on surface) with five clay spheres. 
3 incised ovoids 
1 cylinder 
9 tetrahedrons 
3 trussed ducks6 
5 ovoids 
4 parabolas 
1 triangle 
26 spheres 
= 3 jars of oil 
= 1 animal (sheep or goat) 
= 9 units of services 
= 3 trussed ducks 
= 5 ? 
= 4 ? 
= 1 small measure of grain? 
= 26 bariga of grain7 
6"Trussed ducks" on the left hand side refers to small clay tokens re-
sembling trussed ducks, while the same expression on the right hand side 
refers to the slaughtered animals, similar to those in the supermarket. 
7A bariga is a (larger) unit of measure used in Sumer — perhaps equivalent 
to the English "bushel." 
6
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It is not difficult to recognize that each of these eight lines 
represents a different commodity account identified by a 
specific shape of concrete tokens — just as businessmen give 
different names to different accounts, so the inhabitants of 
ancient Mesopotamia assigned different shapes (or tokens of 
different shapes) to different commodity accounts. Thus the 
singularity of "token accounting" lies in the multiplicity of 
shapes given to easily maleable clay tokens. Although these 
simple and concrete tokens were first associated with village 
life and agriculture, later on these "accounts" were kept (often 
together and even mixed with collections of the more sophisti-
cated abstract tokens) by priests and temple administrators, so 
that the various shapes did not easily change their meaning — 
the shapes were conventionalized and seem to have kept their 
meaning for thousands of years. An envelope of tokens probably 
functioned as a personal account about a steward or debtor 
indicating the equity invested in such a person; but simultane-
ously it was an inventory list detailing this investment. Not 
always did one token stand for a single piece of commodity, 
sometimes it represented a specific measure of grain or a jar of 
oil, etc. Yet those units were only loosely standardized and 
should not be interpreted in any mathematical sense. But it is 
crucial to note that before 3,200 B.C. there is still no evidence 
that those concrete tokens represent numerals. At this stage, 
counting in the abstract sense, as we know it today, had not yet 
Exhibit 4 
4. Clay envelope (showing traces of seal as well as Impressions of hardened 
tokens) with tokens. 
7
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emerged.8 Thus it is correct to say thet accounting preceded 
abstract counting. 
Complex Tokens 
Complex tokens are distinguished from plain tokens by a 
greater variety of token shapes, by markings on those tokens 
(incisions, punctations or appliqué coils, and pellets added to 
the token surface), by a perforation of those tokens for the 
purpose of stringing them and sealing them together (instead of 
putting them into a clay envelope), and, above all, by their more 
abstract usage.9 The term "abstract token" might be confusing 
5. Sketched reconstruction of a string aggregate (showing clay seal on top and 
five perforated ovoid tokens on string) — designed by Ellen Simmons. 
8The crucial step from token counting to a numerical system is best 
described by Bertrand Russell [1919/60, p. 3] who points out that "it must have 
taken ages to discover that a brace of pheasants and a couple of days were both 
instances of the number two." 
9Whereas the plain or concrete tokens had plain unmarked surfaces and 
came in a limited number of simple geometric shapes (flat and lenticular disks, 
cones, tetrahedrons, cylinders and occasionally commodity and animal 
shapes), the later complex or abstract tokens (closely tied to Sumerian temple 
institutions) bore marks on their surface and came in a much greater number of 
shapes (spheres, disks, cones, tetrahedrons, biconoids, ovoids, cylinders, bent 
coils, triangles, parabolas, rectangles, rhomboids, container, animal and other 
shapes). Each shape and marking had a well specified meaning. Typical objects 
of reference of a token were: a measure of grain, a jar of oil, a fleece of wool, or 
even a pot of beer. The cone and sphere were usually used for grain. They 
correspond to the Sumerian ban and bariga which find their analogy in the 
English peck and bushel. 
Exhibit 5 
8
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because those complex tokens are still concrete clay objects, 
but now they are used in a way that approaches numerals in the 
abstract sense. Thus the term "abstract" does not refer to the 
token itself but to its use. But just as in the case of clay 
envelopes, those sealed string collections are equivalent to 
personal accounts about stewards and debtors, and simultane-
ously lists of inventories. 
The Input-Output Principle: From Ancient Mesopotamia to the 
20th Century 
We have seen that by 3200 B.C. two kinds of accounting 
techniques were employed, often simultaneously. The first con-
sisted in keeping plain tokens of different shapes in a marked 
and sealed clay envelope, the other in keeping an even greater 
variety of complex (incised), perforated tokens on a sealed 
string. There is sufficient evidence indicating that the plain 
tokens referred to such assets as grain and cattle while the 
complex tokens referred to services and manufactured goods. 
This separation resembles the distinction between cash items 
(including receivables, payables, etc.) and non-cash items (in-
ventories, equipment, land, etc.) in double entry accounting of 
the Italian Renaissance. And since grain and cattle were the 
payment units or "cash items" of ancient Mesopotamia, the 
parallel is all the more striking. 
Each kind of token shape, whether plain or complex, can 
be interpreted as a type of account, and the number of tokens 
(in a clay envelope or on a string) of a particular shape repre-
sents the quantity of pertinent items. Then all tokens together 
(of different shapes in a particular envelope or on a string) 
represent an equity loosely aggregated by an envelope or string 
(instead of the highly abstract aggregation attainable by 
monetary values). This may seem primitive, yet it spared the 
Sumerian scribe the valuation problem, which not only plagues 
modern accountants but also removed accounting representa-
tion one further step from objective reality, creating subjectiv-
ity and adding ambiguity. Thus the "aggregate" or superac-
count represented by a clay envelope or a collection of tokens 
on a string, is not too much different from a balance sheet. It 
certainly had a dual significance: in its details, it represented 
the individual assets, in its totality it represented an equity. 
But what was the entity behind this equity? Since these 
"aggregates" were most frequently (but not exclusively) found 
in former temple grounds (often a great number of such en-
velopes and string systems were stored in a single temple), the 
9
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entity usually was a temple or, less frequently, an individual 
person, family, or other small social group. There is ar-
cheological evidence that temples levied taxes possibly on the 
basis of farming out temple assets to individual persons (debt-
ors or stewards). Thus the entity was (at least by 3200 B.C.) 
in most cases a temple institution, and the "debtor" probably 
was a particular person. But to determine the entire equity of 
such a temple government one would have had to further 
aggregate all the envelopes and string aggregates within a 
temple precinct — but there may not have been any need for 
doing this since the main purpose of those accounting systems 
was the monitoring of the obligations and levies from indi-
vidual stewards and tax payers. Such a system also lends itself 
to recording the actual payments in kind by the debtor — 
archeologists have, indeed, repeatedly emphasized the debt-
nature of such a token aggregate and of many clay tablets of a 
later age. It is possible even that the tokens or token aggregates 
were handed over as receipts to the debtor or donor by the 
temple administrator once the former's debt was "paid" or a 
donation was made. But whatever the individual practices and 
techniques may have been, there can be little doubt that those 
ancient people moved clay tokens from one place to another in 
strict correspondence with the transfer of commodities and 
debt relations. 
A Duality Principle 
This means, first of all, that those ancient people of the 
Middle East had record keeping systems, the basic logical struc-
ture of which was virtually identical with that of modem double 
entry.10 One might reply that the transfer of ordinary goods, from 
one person to another, already possessed this logical structure 
which we call the input-output or duality principle. This is per-
fectly correct, but the ingenious stroke was to transfer this idea 
or principle from actual commodities by a one-to-one correspon-
dence to a conceptual system of representation. Once this crucial 
10For some thirty years I have tried to make clear to accountants that the 
crucial event in accounting is not double entry — which, after all, is a mere 
technique — but the logic structure behind it [Mattessich 1957/82, 1964, 1987]. A 
set-theoretical analysis of this "flow" or "input-output" structure in terms of 
ownership and debt relations is found in Appendix A of Mattessich [1964, pp. 
448-465]. I have also demonstrated that this structure can manifest itself in 
matrices, net works, vectors, algebraic equations, etc. Now we have evidence 
that this logic structure was already present in record keeping systems some 
10,000 years ago. 
10
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fact of the input-output or duality principle has been estab-
lished, the question whether the ancient Sumerians or any 
other tribe used (more than five thousand years ago) a double 
entry system, is of secondary importance. 
However, a good case can be made that even double entry 
(in the literal sense of the word) emerged as early as 3200 B.C. 
From this time stem the earliest clay envelopes (bullae) that 
bear on their surface the impressions of the tokens contained 
inside. Putting those tokens into an envelope undoubtedly 
meant the recording of quantities of various assets, or what we 
today would call "making debit entries." But apart from this 
were two further needs: (1) to reveal from outside the hidden 
content of the envelope, and (2) to reveal at a glance the entire 
equity represented by the envelope — as far as such an aggre-
gation is possible without a common denominator. By sheer 
coincidence both of these functions could be fulfilled by a 
single act, namely by impressing the hardened tokens into the 
surface of the softer clay envelope. If this interpretation is 
correct, then those "mirror impressions" can be regarded as 
genuine counter-entries (in this case, credit entries) on the 
equity side of such an accounting system — since each token 
inside the envelope represents an asset, and each impression 
outside is part of the total equity. 
Considering that this not only happened more than five 
thousand years ago, before writing and abstract counting was 
invented, the long tradition of accounting must either inspire 
some awe or reinforce the view that accounting is a dusty 
discipline indeed — one that literally arose out of the clay or 
dust of the earth. But there are at least two further important 
aspects to be discussed, both of which have philosophic impli-
cations. 
The Correspondence Theory of Representation 
The importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for the philosophy 
of science as well as for every individual science lies in his 
enduring concern with questions of representation: How can 
language represent reality? What makes it possible for a com-
bination of words to represent a fact? How is it that a sentence 
can say that such-and-such is the case? 
In his first major work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
Wittgenstein [1922] developed his "picture theory" which re-
gards a sentence as a picture (i.e. a model of reality) in the 
following sense: How is it possible that confronted for the first 
time with a sentence (composed of familiar words), we under-
11
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stand this sentence without any explanation? Although a sen-
tence cannot say its meaning (it is only capable of saying that 
so-and-so is the case), it can show its meaning.11 And if it can 
show this, then it must be some kind of picture of reality. Even 
more critical is that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein asserts that 
the relation between the elementary or atomic parts of a true 
sentence must be in one-to-one correspondence with the objects 
and constituents of a fact, i.e. with reality — and it is, above 
all, this "logical atomism" together with its "correspondence 
theory of truth" which he abandons in his later philosophy.12 
Because if 
challenged to explain why we must suppose that 
language is related to the world in that particular 
way, he was — on his own confession — in no 
position to give any literal reply . . . Propositions 
were capable of modeling and, so, describing reality; 
but they could not simultaneously describe how they 
described it, without becoming selfreferential and 
consequently meaningless" [Janik and Toulmin, 
1973, pp. 189-190]. 
Thus the Tractatus has the merit of revealing the limitations 
of prepositional language. It shows that logic as well as ethics 
are transcendental. The Tractatus must not be misinterpreted 
to be a positivistic work: "Positivism holds — and this is its 
essence — that what we can speak about is all that matters in 
life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really 
matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be 
silent about" [Engleman, 1967, p. 97]. 
Wittgenstein's second major work, The Philosophical In-
vestigations (published posthumously in 1953) at least as in-
fluential as the Tractatus, constitutes a rejection of some of his 
major previous thoughts, but it also is a continuation of his 
11"In a letter to Russell, Wittgenstein remarked that his "main contention" 
was this distinction between what can be said in propositions — i.e. in 
language — and what cannot be said but can only be shown. This he said, was 
"the cardinal problem of philosophy" Malcolm [1967, p. 330]. 
12With reference to the important problem of Wittgenstein's connecting of 
elementary or atomic propositions with complex propositions, [Hintika, 1987, p. 
30] offers the following crucial insight: "In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein used the 
truth function theory to extend his picturing idea from atomic propositions to 
all complex ones. In 1928-29 he gave up his belief that truth-function theory 
could serve as such a bridge. Henceforth the same role had to be played by 
suitable human activities ("calculi", later "language games"). The nature of 
these activities was the main problem of his later philosophy." 
12
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earlier philosophic quest. Here the notion of "language games" 
and the importance of linguistic conventions supersede the 
"picture theory." From now on the meaning of a sentence is not 
derived from the picture property but from the use and appli-
cation of the sentence. Wittgenstein's second philosophy is no 
longer limited to the natural sciences and rejects the notion 
that every form (structure) of a proposition can be anticipated 
as a new combination of simple objects.13 On the contrary, new 
language games are possible and embody new "forms of living" 
(Lebensformen). The meaning of a name is not the object it 
pertains to; and naming is not prior to the meaning of a 
sentence because before we know what a name stands for, we 
must already have mastered the pertinent language game. 
So, from now on, Wittgenstein focused his attention 
instead on language as behaviour: concentrating his 
expressions, on the language games within which 
those rules are operative, and on the broad forms of 
life which ultimately give those language games their 
significance. The heart of the "transcendental" pro-
blem thus ceased (for Wittgenstein) to lie in the 
formal character of linguistic representations; in-
stead, it became an element in "the natural history 
of man" [Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 223]. 
The accounting systems of the Sumerians and other an-
cient peoples are obviously not comprehensive or complete 
language systems (in the ordinary sense), and thus cannot offer 
any evidence for or against the validity of logical atomism and 
the correspondence theory of truth. But they are something like 
specialized and limited language systems or, more precisely, 
representational systems for the purpose of giving account of an 
entity's wealth and its flow. And as such they might provide 
evidence for the usefulness of the correspondence theory of rep-
resentation. Not only did every piece of commercial reality (a 
measure of grain, a ewe or ram, a jar of oil or a weight of silver) 
13"The Tractatus held that the ultimate elements of language are names 
that designate simple objects. In the Investigations it is argued that the words 
"simple" and "complex" have no absolute meaning." In the Tractatus the 
existence of simple objects was conceived as following from the requirement 
that the sense of sentences is definite. In the Investigations this requirement is 
regarded as another philosophical illusion. We have imagined an "ideal" of 
languages that will not satisfy actual needs . . . Wittgenstein denied that we 
always understand a sentence . . . sentences have sense only in special cir-
cumstances; in other circumstances we do not understand them . . . The view of 
the Tractatus is entirely different [Malcolm, 1967, pp. 335-336]. 
13
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correspond, to a specific token, but also such relations, as trans-
fer, property rights, and debt claims, were represented by 
proper correspondences in this accounting system (through the 
location of certain tokens in a particular aggregate).14 It does 
not matter that this system itself consisted of relatively con-
crete objects (like clay cylinders, cones, etc.) instead of more 
abstract, written symbols; on the contrary this intermediary 
step reveals to us the evolution of a conceptual system — it not 
only demonstrates that abstraction is a matter of degree but also 
how more abstract representational systems evolved from less 
abstract ones. Above all, the archeological evidence shows that 
the first systematic representational system was based on a 
correspondence notion. The crucial thing is that input-output 
relations apply not only to the actual transfer of commodities but 
also to their representations. Because for the purpose of giving 
account of those transfers of commodities, property claims, and 
their results, clay tokens were removed from one place and put 
into another. 
This archeological evidence shows two things: (1) that the 
precursor of written language was a system of representation 
that exploited the one-to-one correspondence between seg-
ments of reality and certain more or less abstract symbols, and 
(2) that such a one-to-one correspondence proved useful for 
almost five thousand years as a major element of what was 
probably the only systematic representational system available 
to early agricultural communities as well as to the first phase 
of urban culture. With this statement we do not negate the 
objections raised against logical atomism, but we suggest that 
in certain representations situations — particular in those with 
a manageable range and clearly defined concepts — there is a 
place for the correspondence theory. 
14One might argue that the much older paleolithic cave paintings and 
miniature art constitute earlier evidence for a correspondence theory of rep-
resentation. But in these caves only objects (e.g. animals and hunters) are 
clearly represented while the relationships are, at best, merely implied. Cer-
tainly, the systematics necessary for a representational system, and the evi-
dence afforded by the clay envelopes and string aggregates of the token 
accounting systems, is nowhere found in paleolithic art. In other words, 
paleotithic art represented mainly objects while neolithic record keeping 
represented objects as well as facts in Wittgenstein's sense (i.e. relations 
between objects). However, this hypothesis may founder if Margulis and 
Sagan's [1986, p. 222] guess is correct that "hunter-gatherers were sketching 
maps and plotting the movement of planets and stars as early as 40,000 years 
ago." 
14
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Janik and Toulmin [1973] claim that the historical root of 
Wittgenstein's concern for language and "pictorial" represen-
tation lies less in Russell's influence than in Wittgenstein's 
Viennese background: 
Far from originating in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, as 
we shall see, the idea of regarding language, sym-
bolism and media of expression of all kinds as giving 
us "representations" (Darstellungen) or "pictures" (Bilder) had by 1910 become a commonplace in all 
fields of Viennese cultural debate. Among scientists 
this notion had been in circulation at least since the 
time of Hertz, who had characterized physical 
theories as providing just such a Bild or Darstellung 
of natural phenomena [footnote omitted]. At the 
other extreme, it was equally familiar among artists 
and musicians; Arnold Schönberg, for instance, 
wrote an essay on musical thoughts, with the title 
Der Musikalische Gedanke und die Logik, Technik, und 
Kunst seiner Darstellung [footnote omitted]. By the 
time Wittgenstein came to the scene, this debate had 
been going on for some fifteen or twenty years in the 
drawing rooms of Vienna. . ." [Janik and Toulmin, 
1973, p.31]. 
These authors also refer to the influence which the writings 
of the renowned physicist Heinrich R. Hertz [1894] — who was 
trying to present a "picture theory" as a system of mathemati-
cal models — had on Wittgenstein: 
We form for ourselves images or symbols of external 
objects; and the form which we give them is such 
that the necessary consequence of the images in 
thought are always the images of the necessary con-
sequence in nature of the things pictured. In order 
that this requirement may be satisfied, there must be 
a certain conformity between nature and our 
thought. Experience teaches us that the requirement 
can be satisfied, and hence that such a conformity 
does in fact exist. When from our accumulated pre-
vious experience we have once succeeded in deduc-
ing images of the desired nature, we can then in a 
short time develop by means of them, as by means of 
models, the consequences which in the external 
world only arise in a comparatively long time, or as 
the result of our own interposition. We are thus 
enabled to be in advance of the facts, and to decide 
as to present affairs in accordance with the insight so 
obtained. The images which we here speak of are our 
15
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conceptions of things. With the things themselves 
they are in conformity in one important respect, 
namely, in satisfying the above-mentioned require-
ment. For our purpose it is not necessary that they 
should be in conformity with the things in any other 
respect whatever [Hertz, 1899, pp. 1-2]. 
It seems that Hertz too had in mind a correspondence 
theory, but limited to mathematics in relation to the essential 
features of physics. Wittgenstein, on the other hand was am-
bitious enough in his Tractatus to expand this idea to language 
in general as well as to all aspects of factual reality (i.e. 
excluding value judgments). And this venture had to fail as the 
emergence of Wittgenstein's [1953] second philosophy clearly 
showed [Mattessich, 1978, pp. 95-97]. In other words the cor-
respondence theory of representation may be defensible only 
when applied to certain precisely defined languages in corres-
pondence with a limited aspect of reality (physical phenomena, 
certain economic and accounting phenomena, etc.). 
Early Accounting Systems as Precursor of Counting, Writing and 
Model Building 
Counting seems to have emerged in three different stages 
— counting by (1) one-to-one matching of unspecialized tokens 
like pebbles, sticks, etc., (2) by specialized tokens (abstract 
symbols as well as those with morphological similarities to the 
objects represented), and (3) counting with genuine numerals, 
abstracted from any token symbols [Schmandt-Besserat, 1983 
and 1986a]. Only the last stage is counting in the proper or 
modern, abstract sense; it seems to have emerged around 3200 
B.C., simultaneously with writing. This is no coincidence be-
cause the evidence is strong that both activities arose from the 
need to mark the surface of the clay envelopes in such a way 
that the number and kinds of tokens contained in them could 
easily be discerned. This was done by impressing each token 
contained on the soft clay surface (the precursor of cuneiform 
writing), but often not enough space may have been on the 
surface, so a specific shape may have been combined with a 
purely numerical sign (e.g. a number of dots, the first truly 
abstract numerals). 
But those early accounting systems reveal more, something 
of special interest to philosophers pondering over Wittgen-
stein's ideas. Those token systems show that the one-to-one 
correspondence between the tokens (including their position in 
a specific envelope or on a string aggregate) and the pertinent 
16
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economic facts, are not logic relations that can be syntactically 
defined,15 but are semantic relations to be "shown" by usage. 
But this might hold only when dealing with "abstract token 
shapes." Where tokens with morphological similarities to the 
commodities are involved, one might be able to argue that the 
link between the written language and reality is a geometric, 
hence logical-mathematical relation. 
In spite of the fact that this still leaves a "semantic gap" 
between written and spoken language, it hints at the possibility 
that there may be an evolutionary link between logic (in the 
narrow sense of syntactics) and semantics — not only on the 
theoretical but also on the practical level. This difference bet-
ween syntactics and semantics might come close to the distinc-
tion between "stating" and "showing." And the connection 
between the two asumes particular importance in our modern 
world of video and computer technology. Because the latter has 
acquired the ability to state or describe certain aspects of reality 
by means of a logical sequence of magnetized dots (digital 
representation) which in turn are further processed to show 
this reality in form of sounds and more or less genuine pictures 
(analogue representation). 
To master their environment and to manipulate it for the 
satisfaction of their own needs, biological organisms have 
evolved a great variety of reaction mechanisms. In the higher 
animals the most important one is the creation of ideas or 
mental images. This is our window to the world, which, how-
ever, requires certain intermediaries. These are encoding/ 
decoding systems in the form of the internal neuronal language 
system and various external language systems. Whether it is a 
representation through neurons, or the prehistoric representa-
tion of reality through tokens, or modern video-computer im-
agery, in all cases the semantic gap between an abstract rep-
resentation (e.g. a sequence of magnetic dots) and the more 
concrete representation (a television picture) is bridged by 
some kind of language code. Such a code may be purely 
syntactical, but usually incorporates a system of conventions 
("usages") which go beyond mere logical relations. But 
whether the latter are too complex or ambiguous for scientific 
purposes or whether it is for any other reason, the fact is that 
modern semantics fashioned itself to a considerable extent on 
15In Wittgenstein's terminology: "said", "stated" or "described" in contrast 
to "shown". But possibly my interpretation of those words somewhat differs 
from that of Wittgenstein. 
17
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the syntax of logic which, however, should not blur the differ-
ence between the two. 
Two Views 
Furthermore we have seen that both, the prehistoric re-
cording systems as well as the modern video and computer 
systems, demonstrate that the representational view (of the early 
Wittgenstein) and the functional view (of the later Wittgen-
stein) are compatible and do not need to exclude each other. 
Prehistoric accounting systems reveal the logical, indeed set-
theoretical, structure inherent in certain economic aspects of 
reality. The clay envelopes and string aggregates possess the 
structure of sets — or precisely sets of sets, because the super-
set of the entire aggregate can be understood as containing 
subsets, each represented by a different token shape. Hence the 
relations involved are those of "being a subset of"(c) , "being 
an element of" (e )and a "transaction" (an input-output vector). 
And the notorious duality of accounting arises out of the dual 
interpretation of a set as a collection of elements (the input) on 
one side, and as a kind of totality (the output), on the other. 
And a deeper analysis reveals that this duality, in turn, is 
rooted in a physical input-output dichotomy manifesting a 
conservation principle: the giving account of a certain input in 
terms of its output in such economic transactions as the trans-
fer of commodities from one "place" to another, be it for the 
purpose of buying, lending, repaying, manufacturing, selling, 
etc. 
My Answer to Wittgenstein 
Based on the preceding analysis, let me draw my conclu-
sions: 
First, how can we characterize the difference between 
"saying" and "showing"? And is there a link between the two? 
To simply state that sentences say, while pictures show, will 
not do. Probing into the prehistory and early history of writing 
has hopefully lifted some fog. Token accounting as well as 
cuneiform writing, hieroglyphs, offer many examples of various 
steps by which morphological tokens (i.e. those with similarity 
to its referent) and pictographs (both of which seem "to show") 
developed into abstract tokens and ideographs (both of which 
seem "to say"). And now we may raise two questions: (1) At 
what stage did a symbol lose its ability "to show"? And (2) at 
what stage did it gain the ability "to say"? 
18
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The first question is relatively easy to answer: As soon as 
the structural similarity between a symbol and its referent gets 
lost, it can no longer "show" — in this morphology and its loss 
lies the difference between "showing" and "saying." And this 
loss usually occurs at a fairly early stage in the development of 
a sign. 
Even more important, and perhaps more difficult to ans-
wer, is the second question. My personal reply is this: mor-
phological tokens and pictographs do not only "show", they 
also "say" (Marshall McLuhan may have said: "pictographs are 
the message"); or more formally: from its earliest development 
on such symbols are endowed with the power to say.16 Thus the 
morphological tokens and pictographs not only describe struc-
tures, they themselves are similar structures. Yet in subsequent 
steps of development — when these morphological similarities 
have vanished — how can those now abstract tokens or signs 
(in conjunction with some relations: e.g. placing a token into a 
specific receptacle) continue to describe factual entities and 
relations? The evolution of those tokens and linguistic signs 
clearly shows that this "miracle" is made possible through the 
previously established associations between each abstract sign 
and the corresponding morphological token or pictograph 
which in turn is structurally related to the pertinent empirical 
object or fact. On a higher or later level this crucial association 
is established by conventions — which might explain why the 
later Wittgenstein put so much emphasis on linguistic conven-
tions. 
Our facit is that morphological tokens and pictographs are 
a common denominator for "showing" and "saying" — those 
symbols might be the missing link between those two activities. 
And because there exists such a connection, it might be possi-
ble that aggregates of machines like a complete video system is 
capable of transforming something that shows into something 
that says, and vice versa. 
And finally, my answer to Wittgenstein's perennial question 
is that: the representation of reality by means of signs is 
possible because language itself is a double-sided Janus-faced 
creation — not unlike our mind/brain system. Language is 
16This seems to be in disagreement with Wittgenstein's [1922 item 4.1212] 
"what can be shown, cannot be said" and I wonder whether this is due to a 
difference in our notions of "showing" and "saying" or in some misun-
derstanding. 
19
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capable of conveying ideas, yet it is deeply rooted in such physical 
realities as vibrations of air, tokens and tablets of clay, ink on 
papyrus or paper, magnetized dots on plastic tapes, etc. Both, 
language and the mind/brain system, belong to the realm of 
concepts and forms as well as to the realm of matter and energy. 
Everyday languages as well as scientific and technical lan-
guages are possible for the same reason that makes our genetic, 
our neuronal and our hormonal language systems possible. Our 
social languages are certainly not our own original inventions, 
they are merely copies or re-inventions of nature's work; and it 
seems that all "natural" as well as "social" languages are a 
manifestation of nature's basic duality of conceptualization and 
legislation, on one side, and execution and material manifesta-
tion on the other. 
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